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Exemplary Awards in
Securities Arbitration:
Short-Circuited Rights to
Punitive Damages
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite some residual image problems, arbitration is far from a modem day
phenomenon.2 Aristotle himself was a fan of arbitration, "for the arbitrator keeps
equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law."3 However,
inconsistency among federal courts regarding the award of punitive damages by
arbitrators has only furthered the image problem.4 Discord among courts arises
when parties sign a contract agreeing to be bound by the law of a state which
prohibits arbitral awards of punitive damages along with contract language which
seems to express intent to allow punitive damages.5 Under the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), federal courts may vacate arbitration awards that exceed the scope
of the arbitrator's authority.6 This only begs the question of what is the scope of
an arbitrator's authority. In response to this issue, courts among the federal
appellate judiciary have taken opposite views, awaiting guidance from the United
States Supreme Court.7

1. 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct. 1212 (1994). This case is currently
pending before the United States Supreme Court. See infra ADDENDUM, for the Court's holding.
2. Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Tower of Babel
Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 577 (1991).
3.

Id. (citing THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATORS

MANUAL (1989)).
4. J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. 2182, 2183 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
5. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jana, 835 F. Supp. 406, 412 n.7 (N.D. Ill.

1993).
6.

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1992).

Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act states that a

federal court may, upon application of a party to the arbitration, vacate an award "where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers. . . ." Id.
7. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. at 2183 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In October of 1985, Nick DiMinico solicited Antonio and Diana MastrobuQno
("Mastrobuonos") to open a brokerage account with his firm, Shearson Lehman

Hutton, Inc. ("Shearson").'

Upon opening the account, a Client Agreement

9
The
("Agreement") was signed between the Mastrobuonos and Shearson.
Agreement set forth that any controversy relating to the Mastrobuonos' account
would be settled by arbitration and would be governed by New York law."
Four years later, the Mastrobuonos claimed that DiMinico and Shearson had
subjected their account to unauthorized trading," churning," and margin
exposure. 3 The Mastrobuonos filed a complaint with the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, containing federal
claims as well as state statutory and tort claims. 4 The Mastrobuonos requested
punitive damages for the tort claims. 5 The District Court granted Shearson's
motion to compel arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"). 6 The Mastrobuonos retained their claim for punitive damages and
filed an amended complaint in arbitration alleging violations of the NASD Rules
of Fair Practice, 7 S.E.C. Rule l0b-5,' 8 § 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange
Act,' 9 the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act,20 the Texas Deceptive Trade

8.

Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 715.

9. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. III. 1993).
10. Id. Paragraph 13 of the Agreement states, in relevant part:
This agreement... shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York .... [A]ny
controversy arising out of or relating to [the plaintiffs'] accounts ... shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect, of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc. as [the plaintiffs] may elect ....
Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 715.

11.

Unauthorized trading occurs when a broker purchases or sells stock on behalf of an investor

who has not authorized the transaction. 1THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION

§ 10.10.1 (2d ed. 1990).
12. "Churning" occurs when a broker enters into transactions for the purpose of generating
commissions or to make unjustifiable gains from the investor's loss or transaction costs. Id. at § 10.10.
Churning is different from unauthorized trading in that a plaintiff attempts to show that the only
purpose of the excessive trading is to generate fees. Id. Unlike an unauthorized trading claim, the
plaintiff need not argue that the trading was per se unauthorized. Id. at § 10.11.
13.

Mastrobuono,20 F.3d at 715.

14.

Id. at 715.

15.

Id.

16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the Act's general anti fraud provision.
See HAZEN, supra note 11, § 10.10. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1990).
19. Section 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states in part that "[n]o broker or
dealer shall make use of the mails or any means.., of interstate commerce to effect any transaction
in... any security ... otherwise than on a national securities exchange of which it is a member by
15 U.S.C. § 15(c)(1) (1988).
means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device ....
The terms "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device" as used in § 15(c)(1) are defined by
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Practices-Consumer Protection Act,2 breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.22
A panel of three arbitrators held hearings on all claims in August and
September of 1992.23 On the last day of the hearings, Shearson filed a brief
stating that the panel lacked authority to award punitive damages.24 At the
conclusion of the hearings, the Mastrobuonos were awarded $ 115,274.00 for
wrongfully generated commissions and $ 44,053.00 for the margin interest.25 In
addition to these amounts, the panel also ordered Shearson and DiMinico to pay
the Mastrobuonos $ 400,000.00 in punitive damages. 26 Shearson paid the
compensatory damages but challenged the panel's authority to award punitive
damages.2"
Shearson filed a motion in federal district court to vacate the punitive
damages award, arguing that the governing law of the Agreement, New York law,
prohibits an arbitral award of punitive damages.2" In response, the Mastrobuonos
asked the district court to do one of three things; confirm the award, order a trial
on the amount of punitive damages; or hold a separate trial on the punitive
damages claims.29 After a hearing, the district court denied the Mastrobuonos'
motions and vacated the punitive damages award, relying on § 10(a)(4) of the
FAA. 3°
The trial court based its decision on three factors.3 First, the Mastrobuonos
waived the possibility of a punitive damages award by signing the Agreement with
Shearson.32 In holding that the Agreement expressly adopted the laws of New
York, the trial court followed a long line of authority stating that parties to an
arbitration agreement governed by New York law waive any potential for punitive
damages awards.33 Second, the trial court rejected the Mastrobuonos' argument

Rules 15cl-7(b) and 15cl-8 of the 1934 Act.
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 505 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
21. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (West 1987).
22. Mastrobuono,20 F.3d at 715.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Mastrobuono, 812 F. Supp. at 846.
28. Mastrobuono,20 F.3d at 715.
29. Id. at 715-16.
30. Id. at 716. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Under this standard, any errors of law
made by the arbitrator are normally unreviewable. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago
Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991) (noted in Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716). However,
a court may reverse an award that was not clearly "within the contemplation of the parties and ...
implicitly authorized by the agreement." Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No.
9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1164 (7th Cir. 1984)(noted in Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716). Applying these
standards to the case at bar, the court held that "[t]he District Court properly reviewed the panel's
authority to award punitive damages." Mastrobuono,20 F.3d at 716.
31. Mastrobuono, 812 F. Supp. at 847-48.
32. Id. at 848.
33. Id. at 847.
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that the FAA preempts applying the state law rule which precludes punitive
damages.34 The court reasoned that the FAA does not create any independent
rights to arbitrate and that upholding the choice-of-law provision of the contract
is consistent with the goals of the FAA.3" Third, the trial court did not find
language in the Agreement, explicitly or by incorporation, authorizing the award
of punitive damages.36
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed
that the FAA promotes arbitration agreements, but it also found that the
Mastrobuonos could not escape the choice-of-law provision contained in the
Agreement.3" Although the language of the Agreement incorporated the NASD
Code of Arbitration Procedures,3" this did not implicitly authorize an award of
punitive damages in contradiction of the governing state law.39 The court also
held that when an agreement to arbitrate establishes a governing choice of law,
and that law does not allow arbitrators to award punitive damages, the FAA will
not preempt the state law and the potential for punitive damages will be
waived.4
III. LEGAL HISTORY
As illustrated in Mastrobuno, a fiercely debated issue facing commercial
arbitrators today is whether they may award punitive damages. 4 Courts have the
option of confirming or vacating an award of punitive damages only after the
aggrieved party challenges an arbitrator's authority to make such an award.42 In
the context of commercial arbitration,43 a court may ask several questions before

34.

Id.

35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 848.
Mastrobuono,20 F.3d at 716.

38. § 41(e) of the Code provides that arbitral awards "shall contain... a summary of... the
damages and other relief awarded." Id. at 717.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 717-19.
41. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,
Revisited, 66 B.U. L.REv. 953, 955 (1986). "Punitive damages are granted to punish malicious or

willful and wanton conduct. The purpose of such an award is to deter the wrongdoer from similar
conduct in the future as well as to deter others from engaging in such conduct." JOHN D. CALAMARI
& JOSEPH M. PERiLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-3, at 589 (3d ed. 1984).

42. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988). The FAA provides that "after the arbitration award is made any party
to the arbitration may apply to the court... for an order confirming the award." Id. Section 10

provides the authority for vacating arbitration awards. See supra note 6. A dispute between an

investor and abroker finds its way to an arbitrator generally by means of the agreement executed when
the account is opened. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 578.
43. Different concerns are present in other areas of arbitration. Raytheon Co. v. Automated
Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1989). For example, labor arbitration disfavors punitive
awards because of the ongoing relationship between the parties. Id. An award of punitive damages
may decrease parties confidence and commitment to arbitration. Id. In contrast, commercial
arbitration "isnormally considered a one-shot endeavor, inwhich the parties have chosen arbitration
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss1/7
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deciding the fate of an exemplary award."" Courts may examine the specific
language of the parties' contract and the rules of arbitration incorporated into the
agreement for intent to authorize the award of punitive damages.45 If the parties
have included a choice-of-law provision, a court may consider that forum's policy
in regard to awards of punitive damages by arbitrators." In light of the current
split of authority among the federal judiciary, an agreement choosing a forum
which prohibits arbitral awards of punitive damages presents the most difficult
question a court faces. 47 That question is whether to subscribe to one of the
different positions taken by earlier courts or "decide according to equitable
4
assessments while awaiting guidance from the United States Supreme Court., 1
Upon deliberation of several or all of these factors, courts have taken three
main approaches to the punitive damages issue.49 Courts limiting the availability
of punitive damages fall into two categories.5" Some courts follow the rule
established in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. 1 prohibiting arbitral awards of punitive
damages under all circumstances. 52 Other courts limit a commercial arbitrator's
authority to award punitive damages by requiring explicit language to that effect
in the parties' arbitration agreement.53 Still other jurisdictions allow arbitral
although the arbitration agreement contains no express
awards of punitive damages
54
mention of such relief.

not as a means of ongoing dispute resolution, but as a 'simplie], informal, and expeditio[us]' method
of resolving a particular dispute." Id. at 10-11 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
44. See Katsoris, supra note 2, at 587-90.
45. Id. An agreement may be resolved by one of many Securities Regulatory Organizations
("SRO"), including the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 580. These different
organizations have appointed representatives to the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
("Conference"), a task force created to achieve uniformity and consistency in securities arbitration. Id.
at 581. A chief goal of the Conference has been to improve the image of arbitration "as a speedy,
economic and fair method for the resolution of securities disputes." Id. Although not an SRO, the
American Arbitration Association also enjoys popularity among securities arbitrators. See Id. at 584.
46. See Id. at 587-90.
47. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. at 2182-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 590-91.
49. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11; see also, Kelley v. Michaels, 830 F. Supp. 577, 579 (D. Colo.
1993).
50. Raytheon, 882 F.2d. at 11.
51. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
52. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11. The Garrity decision is the most often cited case standing for this
proposition. The Raytheon court lists several jurisdictions that have followed the lead of the Garrity
rule holding that even express consent of the parties could not confer authority to award punitive
damages in purely private disputes. Id.
53. Id. An intermediate state court in California took this position in Belko v. AVX Corp., 251
Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). For a contrary treatment of the punitive damages issue by a
different California appellate court, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
54. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11.
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A. RestrainingArbitral Punitive Damages Awards
Courts limiting an arbitrator's authority to award punitive damages have done
so on several grounds. Many brokers include a forum selection clause in their
customer agreements providing, for example, that the "agreement . . .shall be

governed by the laws of the State of New York."" New York is an important
state in this regard for two reasons. First, the substantive law of New York
permits courts to award punitive damages under certain circumstances. 6
However, the arbitration law of New York does not permit an arbitrator to award
punitive damages under any circumstances." New York arbitration law is also
important because many brokers specify New York in forum selection clauses."8
In Garrity, the New York Court of Appeals struck down an award by a
commercial arbitration panel, holding that "[a]n arbitrator has no power to award
punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties." 59 In doing so, the court
relied on the strong public policy that punitive damages remain asanction reserved
to the state and that parties could not submit themselves to punishment directly or
Courts have taken this rationale, along with a
through arbitration.60
choice-of-law provision specifying New York law, and held arbitral awards of

55. Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman, III, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration:
Rule 15c2-2, Fraud,Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, ClassArbitration,Punitive Damages, Rights
of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65 TuL. L. REv. 1547, 1599 (1991).
56. Id.In New York, punitive damages are available when a defendant has engaged in willful
and wanton misconduct Id.
.57. Id.at 1600.
58. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. at 2183 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("most securities agreements contain
arbitration provisions, and many are governed by New York law."). See also Katsoris, supra note 2
("many arbitration agreements contain a New York choice-of-law clause.").
59. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
60. Id.In his article, Stipanowich noted the concern of the majority in Garrity "regarding the
displacement of the courts as arbiters of social justice ... by the perceived absence of standards for
judicial oversight of arbitrators' awards." Stipanowich, supra note 41, at 961. He also explained that
the court feared "oppressive misuse of arbitral power" and that arbitration "would become little more
than a trap for the unwary, with unpredictable results, eroding confidence in its use and ultimately
destroying its value." Id. at 962.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss1/7
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punitive damages unenforceable. 6 This reasoning has enjoyed approval and
support from other state courts as well as federal courts.62
Courts which limit an arbitrator's remedial powers begin their discussion of
punitive damages with the applicability of the Garrity rule.63 Although not all
courts treat it as such, the availability of punitive damages is a preemption issue,
turning on whether New York law or federal substantive arbitration law
governs.'
In Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman,6" the Second Circuit faced this
issue and concluded that the FAA did not preempt the Garrityrule. 66 To support
this position, the Fahnestock court pointed to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr.,
Univ.6 ' The Supreme Court in Volt found that "[tihe FAA contains no specific
preemption provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire
field of arbitration." 68 In this regard, state law is only preempted by the FAA

61. "The [Garrity]rule maintains its vitality in the courts of New York." Fahnestock & Co. v.
Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Barbier v.Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948
F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991). Garrityalso stands for the proposition that an agreement to arbitrate
disputes under New York law acts as a waiver of the right to exemplary relief in any form.
Stipanowich, supra note 41, at 963.
In Pierson v. Dean Witter, Reynolds, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's
determination that the investors had not waived their right to punitive damages as a result of the
Garrityrule. The lower court judge found that "[the investors] did not specifically agree to waive their
right to full legal remedy, including punitive damages" and refused to "thrust that harsh result upon
them." Pierson, 742 F.2d at 337 n.4. On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
investors could not "use their failure to inquire about the ramifications of [the choice-of-law] clause
to avoid the consequences of agreed-to arbitration." Id. at 339.
62. Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., Inc., 698 P.2d 880, 882 (N.M. 1985); Baselski v. Paine Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 543 (N.D. I1. 1981). Garrity finds it's strongest support
in two decisions from the Second Circuit. Barbier,948 F.2d 117 at 121; Fahnestock, 935 F.2d 512
at 517. See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
63. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jana, 835 F. Supp. 406, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121; Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517.
64. Jana,835 F. Supp. at 412; see also Barbier,948 F.2d at 122; Fahnestock,935 F.2d at 518.
"The effect of the [FAA] is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
65. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942 (1992).
66. Id.at 517.
67. 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517.
68. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477, cited in Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 517. In regard to federal preemption,
the Supreme Court found that "[t]he body of preemptive federal substantive law that supports the FAA
... developed largely in response to state laws that restrict arbitration in derogation of agreements
freely negotiated." Id.at 518.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1995, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 7
[Vol. 1995, No. 1
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
when it actually conflicts with federal law.69 In Fahnestock, the court concluded
that no such conflict existed between the FAA and the Garrity rule.7
In Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the Second Circuit reversed
the trial court's confirmation of an arbitral award of punitive damages.72 Relying
on the earlier Fahnestock decision, the court determined that the FAA only
required enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, not the preemption of
federal arbitration law over state law. 3 Therefore, the court's decision to apply
the Garrityrule under the choice-of-law clause specifying New York law merely
enforced4 the parties' agreement, which is "fully consistent with the goals of the
FAA.

7

69. Id.However, the Fahnestock court noted that if the parties had specifically agreed to permit
the arbitrators to award punitive damages, "federal arbitration law might require confirmation." Id.
In Volt, the Supreme Court stated that parties are free to fashion their own arbitration agreements and
the FAA would require enforcement of such an agreement. Id.In Barbier,the Second Circuit again
cited Volt to enforce provisions of an arbitration clause contained in a securities agreement. Barbier,
948 F.2d at 122. See also infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
70. Volt, 489 U.S. at 517. The Fahnestock court conceded that the Garrityrule runs against the
grain of federal arbitration law and emphasized that specific language on the punitive damages issue
may have negated application of the Garrity rule. Id.at 518. In addition, the court left open the
possibility that another arbitration organization may provide language authorizing punitive awards by
restricting their ruling to the language of the New York Stock Exchange Constitution and rules. Id.
See also infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
Judge Mahoney dissented in Fahnestock and noted that the majority analysis created an
unnecessary split among the circuits. Volt, 489 U.S. at 520. First, the dissent found the majority's
application of the Garrity rule inappropriate and that federal law should have provided the rules of
decision. Id. For support, the dissent also cited the Supreme Court in Volt, finding that state law
restricting the right to arbitrate disputes in accordance with an agreement conflicts with the FAA and
is preempted thereby. Id.For further support, Judge Mahoney pointed to other circuits which do not
automatically subject agreements to the Garrityrule because the forum selection clause specifies New
York law. Id. at 521.
71. 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 123. The trial court "recognized that the FAA does not preempt the application of all
state laws, especially where the parties have provided in their agreement for the application of state
laws." Id.at 119. See also Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 155. However, the lower court refused to bind
the parties to the Garrity rule simply because the choice-of-law clause specified New York law.
Barbier,948 F.2d at 120. Instead, the court distinguished between New York substantive law and New
York arbitration law. Id. After concluding that the Garrity rule is arbitration law, the court stated that
"the parties did not intend . . . that New York arbitration law be applied to disputes under the
Agreement." Id. The Second Circuit, however, did not agree and reasoned that a policy based
foundation underlying the Garrty rule did not render it any less a rule of substantive law. Id at 122.
73. Id.See also supra note 68.
74. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122. The court determined that the agreement should be enforced
according to it's terms, "even if the result is that punitive damages are prohibited where in the absence
of the choice-of-law provision, they would be permitted." Id.
The Jana court cited the Second Circuit decisions in Fahnestock and Barbier as persuasive
authority that the Garrityrule is not preempted by federal law. Jana, 835 F. Supp. at 413. Although
the parties agreed that "[the] case is governed by the law of New York to the extent that it is not
preempted by the FAA," the court concluded that New York law governed both the interpretation and
the enforcement of the agreement. Id.at 408. Determining the rights of the parties according to New
York law merely enforced the terms of the contract. Id. at 413.
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Closely related to the issue of preemption, courts also consider the parties'
basis for jurisdiction when determining the availability of punitive damages.7
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,76 the
United States Supreme Court found that although the FAA "creates a body of
federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement
to arbitrate, . . . it does not create any independent federal question
jurisdiction."" Therefore, as the court in Fahnestock observed, the parties
invoked diversity jurisdiction as a means of acquiring subject matter
jurisdiction. 8 In Fahnestock, the court explained that since jurisdiction is based
on diversity, state law is not preempted by federal law and should govern the
availability of punitive damages. 9 By reaching this conclusion, the court cleared
the way for application of the Garrityrule, prohibiting arbitral award of punitive
damages.8"
Another basis advanced by courts limiting punitive damage awards involves
judicial interpretation of whether the agreement language itself authorizes
arbitrators to make exemplary awards."s A typical arbitration clause will specify
that all arbitration will be conducted pursuant to the rules of one of many
securities organizations, such as the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), the
NASD, or the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). 8 2 Upon election of
an organization by the parties, the arbitration rules of that organization are then
incorporated into the agreement to govern all arbitration. 3
In Fahnestock, the Second Circuit examined the language of the NYSE
constitution and rules of arbitration for language concerning the issue of punitive
damages.8 4 Despite containing broad language, the court found the NYSE
provisions silent regarding the scope of potential remedies and the issue of

75.
76.
77.
78.

See generally Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121; Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518. The requirements of diversity jurisdiction are set out in 28

U.S.C. § 1332 (1993).
79. Fahenstock, 935 F.2d at 519. The court reached this conclusion by finding that "state law
relating to the propriety of a punitive damages award by arbitrators in the absence of an agreement on
the subject is not preempted by any federal substantive law bearing on the subject" Id.
80. Id.
81. See generally Jana, 835 F. Supp. at 411; Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 521.
82. Jana, 835 F. Supp. at 408; Barbier, 948 F.2d at 119; Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc.,
742 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1984). The typical agreement provides that "[any controversy between
by arbitration, in
[investor] and [broker] arising out of or relating to this contract... shall be settled
accordance with the rules . . . of either the American Arbitration Association, or the Board of
Arbitration of the New York Stock Exchange, as the [investor] may elect." Id.at 336.
83. Jana, 835 F. Supp. at 409. "Having chosen to arbitrate this case with the NASD, the Janas
have chosen that the case be governed by the NASD Code as well." Id. See also Fahnestock, 935 F.2d
at 518.
84. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519.
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In the eyes of the court, failure to include within the

agreement specific language or arbitration rules expressly authorizing arbitrators
to award punitive damages foreclosed the option of making such an award. 6
to empower arbitrators to award punitive damages,
"Clearly, if the NYSE wanted
'
87
it could have done so.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jana,"s the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois stayed arbitration proceedings to determine if
the parties' agreement authorized arbitral awards of punitive damages.8 9 Upon
searching the agreement, the court concluded that no such authorization was
given.90 The arbitration clause incorporated the NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedures ("Code") which, the court found, makes no specific provision for
punitive damages.9' The investors argued that the language of the Arbitrator's
Manual ("Mannual") 92 specifically stated that arbitrators may consider punitive
damages as a remedy. 3 The relevant portion of the Manual provides that "[t]he
issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in arbitrations. Parties
to arbitration are informed that arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a
remedy."' However, the court rejected this argument because only the Code was
incorporated into the agreement, not the Manual. 9 Had the Manual or other
specific language authorizing punitive damages been part of the parties' agreement,

85. Id. The NYSE Constitution provides that "[a]ny controversy between... a member... and
any other person, arising out of the business of such member .... shall at the instance of any such
party, be submitted for arbitration .... " Id. at 518. In addition, NYSE rule 600(a) provides for the
arbitration of "[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy." Id. at 519.
To support a claim that the arbitrators were empowered to award punitive damages, the investor
in Fahnestock pointed to the NYSE award form which contains a specific heading marked "punitive
damages" allowing for the entrance of such awards. Id. However, the court found that the award form
was not part of the arbitration agreement and that the Garrity rule still required vacatur of the award.
Id.

Judge Mahoney's dissent in Fahnestock also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
NYSE language. Id. at 521. The dissent considered the award form relevant in determining the
availability of punitive damages and found that it provided evidence of intent to authorize punitive
damages. Id. To conclude, Judge Mahoney reasoned that "a much more hospitable approach to
arbitral power to award punitive damages is appropriate... [gliven the rule that ambiguities [are to
be] resolved in favor of arbitration." Id. at 521.
86. Id. at 519. The court's reading and interpretation of the NYSE provisions was later cited
with approval in Barbier. In contrast, the court noted that had the agreement incorporated the rules
of the AAA, a different result may have ensued. The AAA rules provide that arbitrators may award
"any remedy or relief which [is] just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement." Id.
87. Id.
88. 835 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. III. 1993).
89. Id. at 414.
90. Id. at 412.
91. Id.
92. The Manual was compiled by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration. Id. at 412.
See also supra note 45.

93. Jana, 835 F. Supp. at 412.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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the court noted that this may have required preemption over New York law
prohibiting arbitral punitive damages awards.96

B. Supportfor Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards
The analysis used by courts allowing arbitral awards of punitive damages is
much the same as those that do not. They begin by examining the agreement
language and incorporated arbitration rules for evidence of the parties' intent to
include punitive damages within the scope of potential remedies.97 If the
arbitration clause can be interpreted to authorize punitive damages, the next step
is to consider the forum selection clause, if one is included.9 Finally, a court
must determine if federal law or state law is to govern the agreement." •
The most prominent federal case upholding an arbitral award of punitive
damages is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. i" The Bonar court began by analyzing the parties' agreement and
discovered that the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules ("AAA Rules") were
incorporated into the arbitration clause."0' The court found the agreement "far
from a model of clarity on the subject of punitive damages"'0 2 because a close
review revealed that the AAA Rules do not explicitly mention punitive
damages.'0 3 In concluding that the investors did not intend to waive their right
to punitive damages simply by signing such a vague agreement, the court followed
federal policy mandating resolution of ambiguities in favor of arbitration."°4

96. Id.The court explained the predicament it faced by stating that "aconclusion that the quoted
language was part of the parties' contract would require the Court to choose between conflicting terms
within the customer agreement. One term, the incorporation of the NASD Rules, would permit
punitive damages; another term, the incorporation of New York law, would prohibit them." Id.
97. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1989).
98. Id.atll.
99. Id.
100. 835 F.2d 1378 (1 1th Cir. 1988). See also Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28
F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 1993); J. Alexander Sec., Inc.
v. Mendez, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1090, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991); Pyle v. Sec. U.S.A., Inc.,
758 F. Supp. 638, 640 (D. Colo. 1991).
101. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386.
102. Id.at 1388.
103. Id. Section 42 (currently Section 43) of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules states that
"[tihe arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which he deems just and equitable and within the
scope of the agreement." Id. at 1386. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
104. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387-88. This policy was first enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. and later followed by Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima
Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 358 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985). "Willoughby
tells us that in light of the federal policy that 'any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration,' we must give precedence to the contract provisions allowing for
punitive damages." Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387. The Bonar court, by interpreting the AAA Rules in this
manner, implies that only an express exclusion of punitive damages in the agreement would deprive
arbitrators of authority to make such an award. Id.at 1388. In contrast, courts which limit arbitral
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After determining the language of the AAA Rules sufficiently broad to authorize
an arbitral award of punitive damages, the court turned to the choice-of-law
provision, specifying New York law, to ascertain whether it's inclusion rendered
punitive damages no longer within the scope of the parties' agreement.'0 5
The court concluded that the choice-of-law provision did not have the above
effect." 6 Although the Garrity rule would have applied under New York law,
the FAA governed the agreement and such a provision in a contract subject to the
FAA does not prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.'0 7 To reach
this conclusion, the court found the parties' agreement "evidenced a transaction in
interstate commerce"' 08 and that the Garrity rule "deal[s] only with the powers
of arbitrators under state law and state public policy, and has no application in
cases arising under the Arbitration Act. '" 9 Thus, the court determined that a

awards of punitive damages require an express agreement in order to empower arbitrators to award
punitive damages. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
105. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386-87. By reading the language of the AAA Rules to include punitive
damages within the scope of potential relief, the Bonar court followed the interpretation given to
similar contract language by the Willoughby court. Id. at 1387.
Although receiving favorable treatment by sister circuits, the majority's decision in Bonar was
not unanimous. In a special concurrence, Circuit Judge Tjoflat agreed that, under circuit precedent,
the arbitrator was not precluded from awarding punitive damages. Id. at 1388. However, he failed
to see "how punitive damages can ever be considered 'within the scope of the agreement of the parties'
absent some express provision in the contract." Id. Focusing on the contractual nature of the parties'
agreement, Judge Tjoflat found it doubtful that the scope of relief in a contract dispute could "fairly
be said to encompass the assessment of a penalty for willful or wanton misconduct" Id. at 1389. He
stated that the AAA rules recognized this important distinction by limiting the available remedies to
those within the scope of the parties' agreement Id. He concluded that the majority's "adherence to
a different rule reflects a basic misunderstanding of the nature of punitive damages and the scope of
arbitrators' remedial powers." Id.
106. Id.at 1387.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found support for this position in Willoughby. After considering
the foundation and rationale used in Garrity,the Willoughby court rejected the public policy arguments
supporting the Garrityrule and concluded that "there is no public policy bar which prevents arbitrators
from considering claims for punitive damages." Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 361. Another district
court also came to this conclusion a year before Willoughby was decided. Willis v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983). The Willis court "perceiveld] no public policy
reason persuasive enough to justify prohibiting arbitrators from resolving issues of punitive damages
submitted by the parties." Id. at 824.
Many courts have employed an "interstate commerce" analysis to determine whether federal law
or state law will govern an agreement. Under Section 2, the FAA governs any "contract evidencing
a transaction involving [interstate] commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The Willoughby court also
concluded that the parties' contract "evidence[ed] a transaction in interstate commerce" and that federal
policy favoring arbitration governed the agreement. Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 359. In Willis, the
court stated that "before the [FAA] becomes applicable ....
the court must be satisfied that ... the
contract containing the arbitration provision evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce."
Willis, 569 F. Supp. at 823. Subsequently, the Willis court found that "the interstate character of the
contract is evident [because] [tihis is a diversity action between a resident plaintiff and a foreign
securities broker." Id. The Eighth Circuit also recently affirmed this rationale in Lee v. Chica, 983
F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993). "Arbitrability of contracts evidencing interstate commerce is governed by
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choice-of-law clause merely designates the substantive law to be applied in
determining whether the conduct of the parties warrants an exemplary award, ' "it
0
does not deprive the arbitrators of their authority to award punitive damages." "
The First Circuit, in Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc.,"
confirmed an arbitral award of punitive damages and based it's decision on the
rationale espoused in Bonar."' After determining that the FAA governed the
parties' agreement due to its interstate character, the court followed the Bonar
court's interpretation of the AAA language and found sufficient authority to award
punitive damages." 3 In addition, the Raytheon court offered a policy rationale
in favor of allowing exemplary awards in arbitration." 4 The court failed to find
a compelling reason to prohibit arbitrators from awarding punitive damages if the
same conduct would give rise to such an award if proved to a court." 5
"Certainly, the fact that the parties agreed to resolve their dispute through an
expedited and less formal procedure does not mean that they should be required
to surrender a legitimate claim to damages.""' 6

federal law rather than state law." Id. at 886.
110. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387 (citing Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 359). The Willis court also
found that "even assuming New York law applies, federal law governs the categories of claims subject
to arbitration ...[and] ...[i]f an issue is arbitrable under federal law, it remains so despite contrary
state law." Willis, 569 F. Supp. at 823-24.
111. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
112. Id.at 11. Although not a case concerning securities, the Raytheon court employed the case
law on commercial arbitration, adopting the view that "the contract's choice-of-law provision does not
require us to determine the punitive damages question by looking to the law of the chosen forum..
Rather, we look to federal common law for our answer." Id.n.5.
113. Id.at 11-12. The Raytheon court agreed with other courts "that both the parties' adoption
of AAA ...Rule 42... and the general canon that federal law governs the construction of arbitration
agreements respecting interstate commerce" support the conclusion that the arbitrators were empowered
to award punitive damages. Id.at 11 n.5.
Another commercial arbitration case, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Todd Shipyards Corp. v.
Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991), also chose the "expansive view" taken by Bonar
and Raytheon in regard to the language of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. Id.at 1063. The
Cunardcourt also relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Volt to conclude that choosing New York
law to govern the agreement did not preclude punitive damages. Id.at 1062.
The Eighth Circuit, in Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 287
(1993), recently pointed to the decisions in Bonar, Raytheon, and Cunardas authority for allowing an
arbitral award of punitive damages under the language of the AAA. Id.at 888. The Lee court noted
that Minnesota, the governing law of the parties' agreement, had adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act
and held that their conclusion would have been the same if they were to apply the UAA instead of the
FAA due to the similarities between the two. Id.The liberal construction of the AAA language was
not unanimous, however. Judge Beam, writing in dissent, failed to find authority to award punitive
damages in the language of AAA Rule 43. Id.at 889.
114. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 12.
115. Id.Like other courts around the nation, the Raytheon court agreed that "punitive damages
can serve as an effective deterrent to malicious or fraudulent conduct." Id. at 12.
116. Id. The Willoughby court also supported this position by finding that a waiver of the right
to punitive damages "not only would ... seriously undermine the value and sufficiency of the arbitral
process as a method of dispute resolution, it would also constitute a total frustration of the public
policies and purposes served by punitive damage awards." Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 363.
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Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, in Baravati v. Josephthal,Lyon & Ross,
Inc., l confirmed an arbitral award of punitive damages."'
Writing for the
court, Chief Judge Richard Posner realized that where diversity is the basis for
federal jurisdiction, "substantial constitutional questions would arise if the federal
courts tried to create a body of substantive law to be applied by the
arbitrators."'" 9
Although the FAA is limited to diversity cases affecting
interstate commerce, federal courts are free to create a body of substantive law
applicable to cases falling within the scope of the act. 20
Baravati is also important because the court interpreted the language of the
parties' agreement, which incorporated the NASD Code, to embrace punitive
damages within the scope of potential relief.'2' The court did not find specific
authority to award punitive damages in the NASD Code, but did not conclude that
silence on the issue prohibited such authority "given the tradition of allowing
arbitrators flexible remedial discretion."'22 Other courts interpreting the NASD
Code language have adopted an expansive view and allowed punitive
damages to
23
be awarded where the agreement incorporates the NASD Code.

117. 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
118. Id. at711.
119. Id. at 707. Judge Posner discussed that the conferral of diversity jurisdiction on federal
courts by Article III of the U.S. Constitution "d[id] not authorize them to create substantive law to
govern disputes arising under that jurisdiction." Id. (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)).
120. Id. Judge Posner found authority for this position in two U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
121. Baravati, 28 F.3d at 709.
122. Id. at 710. A California appellate court refused to conclude that the "NASD's failure to
specifically address the issue of punitive damages in its arbitration rules manual expressly precluded
the arbitrators... from awarding punitive damages." J.Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 17 Cal. App.
4th 1083, 1092, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), reh'gandreh'gen banc denied, cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1993). The Mendez court rejected the argument that the agreement did not
contemplate punitive damages simply because the arbitration was conducted pursuant to NASD rules
and not those of the AAA. Id.
123. Focusing on the language of the NASD Code § 1, which provides for the parties to arbitrate
"any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of
the Association," two district courts have found authority for arbitral punitive damages awards under
the NASD Code. Pyle, 758 F. Supp. at 640 ("1 concluded that 'any dispute, claim or controversy'
includes a claim for punitive damages."). In Kelley v. Michaels, 830 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Oki. 1993),
the court determined that "the expansive view of an arbiters' power to decide disputes, coupled with
the incorporation of the NASD Code of Arbitration Rules in the parties' agreement, provide[d] the
arbitration panel with the authority to award punitive damages." Id. at 580.
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IV.

INSTANT DECISION

In Mastrobuono, the Seventh Circuit faced an arbitral award of punitive
damages.' 24 After determining the proper scope of review, the court began it's
discussion by applying the Garrity rule.'25 The court then turned to the
language of the NASD Code and determined that it did not grant the arbitration
panel authority to award punitive damages.'26 Third, the court determined that
a preemption analysis was unnecessary because the parties adopted the Garrityrule
as the law of the Agreement. 2 Finally, the court concluded that Illinois
arbitration law did not govern the Agreement as a result of New York's law of
conflicts. 2 "
First, the court observed that a narrow scope of review applied but found that
this did not immunize an award that clearly exceeded the bounds of the
Agreement. 29 Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Barbier, the court
concluded that it is manifest that the arbitration panel exceeded their power by
awarding punitive damages. 3 To reach this conclusion, the court stated that
since the parties specified New York law without excluding its arbitration law, the
Garrity rule was adopted as the binding rule of the Agreement. 3 ' The
Mastrobuonos argued that the Garrityrule was inapplicable because the Agreement
The court dispensed with this
failed to expressly prohibit punitive awards.'
argument by stating that specific exclusions must be written into the Agreement
because no other source could provide them."'
Next, the court considered the Mastrobuono's argument that the NASD Code
of Arbitration Procedures and the Arbitrator's Manual expressly authorized an

124.

Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d 715.

125. Id. at 716-17.
126. Id. at 717.
127. Id. at 719.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 716. For support, the court pointed to the language of an earlier Seventh Circuit
decision, stating that a "court may reverse [an] award that 'clearly' was not 'within the contemplation
of the parties and ... implicitly authorized by the agreement.'" Id. (citing Miller Brewing Co. v.
Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1164 (7th Cir. 1984)).
130. Id. Although the court recognized that "[t]he arbitrator's errors of law and contract
construction are normally unreviewable," the court found that "our narrow scope of review does not
immunize an award clearly unauthorized by the terms of the agreement." Id. at 716.
131. Id. at 717. The court pointed to another Seventh Circuit case where the factual situation
was similar. Id. In that case, the investors were not allowed to recover punitive damages and could
not use their ignorance of New York arbitration law to escape the consequences of their agreement.
Id. (citing Pierson, 742 F.2d at 334). However, the Pierson court "did not address the argument that
some other provision of the agreement authorized punitive damages, contra the choice of New York
law." Id. at 717.
132. Id. The Mastrobuonos argued that the language "any controversy arising out of or relating
to [the Mastrobuono's account] shall be settled by arbitration" included a claim for punitive damages.
Id.

133. Id.
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The Agreement offered the Mastrobuonos
arbitral award of punitive damages.'
a choice of organizations to conduct the arbitration hearing.'
Since the NASD
was chosen, the court concluded that neither the NASD Code nor the Manual
grants a substantive right to punitive damages because this would directly conflict
with the governing law of the Agreement.' 36 Even if the NYSE rules were
chosen to govern the arbitration, punitive damages would not have been within the
scope of potential remedies.'37 The court reasoned that the parties did not intend
for the availability to punitive damages to depend on which organization's rules
were chosen and found "[tihe more3 sensible construction of the agreement is that
the Garrity rule always controls.'
The third basis for the court's decision rested upon interpretation of federal
policy. 39 The Mastrobuonos urged that federal policy requires arbitration be
favored in any conflicts between the NASD and New York law. 4° Although
conceding federal policy that doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues be
resolved in favor of arbitration, the court found that this policy does not
encompass the availability of exemplary awards.' 4 '
When determining the availability of punitive remedies, the court concluded
that the federal policy in favor of arbitration is not as persuasive.'42 Although
the agreement to arbitrate disputes must be liberally construed, this does not mean
that all remedies are to be made available in arbitration. 14 3 The court recognized
that other circuit courts have reached a different result, but decided to resolve any
conflict between New York law and the NASD rules in favor of New York
law.'44 Because the court concluded that the parties intended for Garrity to be
the binding rule, it found that enforcing the state rule did not offend the policies
espoused in the FAA. 4"
Finally, the court determined that the New York's law of conflicts did not
direct the application of Illinois law rather than New York law. 46 Illinois' law
of conflicts allows the parties' chosen law to apply unless it is strongly contrary

134. Id. Section 41(e) of the Code provides that arbitral awards "shall contain.., a summary
of ... the damages and other relief awarded." Id. See also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 715. See supra note 10.
136. Id.at 717.
137. Id. The court determined that "the arbitration rules of the NYSE ... do not empower
arbitrators to award punitive damages." Id. This interpretation of the NYSE provisions follows the
Second Circuit's reading in Fahnestock. Id. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 717-18.
139. Id. at 718.
140. Id.
141. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital was cited as
authority for the federal policy favoring arbitration. Id at 717.
142. Id. at 718
143. Id. The court observed that the FAA does not prefer any particular type of remedy. Id.
144. Id. The other circuit court decisions referred to are Bonar (11 th Circuit), Raytheon (1st
Circuit), Cunard (9th Circuit), and Lee (8th Circuit). Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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to Illinois public policy. 47 The court found no such policy in Illinois that
conflicts with the Garrity rule and actually found that Illinois disfavors arbitral
awards of punitive damages.' 48 Therefore, the court concluded that the parties'
choice-of-law provision should be applied to preclude punitive damages because
the parties did not specifically exclude the Garrityrule and the Agreement failed
to explicitly grant the arbitrators power to make exemplary awards. 49
V. COMMENT
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit faced a circuit split on the issue
of arbitral awards of punitive damages. After considering the contrary views taken
on the issue, the court decided to follow the line of cases limiting the availability
of punitive damages. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Baravati
v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc.,5 ' summarized the difference between the
instant case and contrary decisions as "simply a difference over the proper
interpretation of the choice-of-law clause read in light of the parties' agreement
to have their disputes arbitrated under rules that allow for the award of punitive
damages."''
Judge Posner aptly characterized the current dispute between the
circuits through this concise assertion.
A. Interstate Commerce and Choice-of-law Provisions
Although the FAA is silent on the issue of punitive damages, it undoubtedly
promotes settling disputes through the forum of arbitration."' There is also no
doubt that the FAA applies to transactions involving interstate commerce.'
Most securities agreements, like the one in the instant decision, involve interstate
commerce and are generally governed by the FAA." 4 Once this is decided, the

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 717-19.
150. 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994).
151. Id. at 709. Judge Posner completes his analysis by stating that other circuits believe that
these provisions are best reconciled by confining the choice of law provisions to substantive matters,
allowing the arbitrators free rein in procedural and remedial matters." Id.
152. Katsoris, supra note 2.
153. Id. See also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (holding that if an agreement to
arbitrate evidences interstate commerce, the FAA requires parties to arbitrate dispute); supranotes 109114 and accompanying text.
154. Id. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). In Willis v. Shearson/Amer. Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821
(M.D.N.C. 1983), the court noted that the "interstate character of the contract is evident [because] [tihis
is a diversity action between a resident plantiff and a foreign securities broker." Id. at 823. The court
also found that "the Federal Arbitration Act applies to the arbitration provision . . . since that
agreement is a written contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce." Id.
The court in Singer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988), found that "[t]he
customer agreement ... is 'a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,' therefore the
Arbitration Act applies." Id. at 279. This finding led to the conclusion that "regardless of the
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prevailing view is that a choice-of-law provision indicates only the substantive law
to apply when determining whether the conduct involved warrants a punitive
award and does not operate to restrict an arbitrator's authority to award punitive
In the instant case, for example, New York substantive law would
damages.'
determine whether the defendant's conduct justifies an award of punitive damages.
The more important determination, whether punitive damages are available, would
be governed by federal law.'
The court, however, fails to address the interstate character of this case.
Instead, it forgoes this analysis by concluding that the parties intended to settle
By concluding
their disputes subject to New York law and the Garrity rule.'
that New York law is "the governing law of the agreement under all
circumstances,"' 58 the court also misinterprets the role of New York substantive
law in this case. Although support can be found for the court's position, the
predominant view concerning the availability of punitive damages directly
contradicts this analysis." 9
The court's reasoning follows closely the Second Circuit's treatment of the
issue in Fahnestock. There, the court noted that absent a contrary agreement on
the subject, state law would be preempted only if it actually conflicts with federal

choice-of-law provision in the agreement (New York in this case), the court must be guided by federal
law with respect to arbitral claims." Id. at 278. See also Mendez, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1090, 21 Cal.

Rpir. 2d at 830 ("[b]ecause the Case Account Agreement 'evidenced a transaction in interstate
commerce,' the FAA applies."); Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9 ("[slince the arbitration clause under
consideration was part of a contract which affected interstate commerce, [respondent] is correct in its
contention that the broad policies of the Federal Arbitration Act... govern our analysis."); Bonar, 835
F.2d at 1387 ("because the customer agreement evidenced a transaction in interstate commerce, it is
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act").

155. Mendez, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1090, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830 ("[tlhe choice-of-law provision
[in the contract] merely designates the substantive law that the arbitrators must apply in determining
whether the conduct of the parties warrants punitive damages; it does not deprive the arbitrators of their
authority to award punitive damages."). Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for
certiorari in Mendez, Justice O'Connor, with whom the Chief Justice joined, wrote a dissenting
memorandum to the denial. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. at 2182. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor noted that
the Mendez decision "is in accord with several federal decisions holding that the Arbitration Act
preempts state law prohibitions on arbitral punitive damages awards." Id. She also stated that the
Mendez decision "irreconcilably conflicts with [the instant case]." Id. at 2183.
See also Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387 ("the choice-of-law provision does not deprive the arbitrators
of their power to award punitive damages."); Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11 n.5 ("the contract's
choice-of-law provision does not require us to determine the punitive damages issue by looking to the
law of the chosen forum"); Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 359 ("[a]lthough the parties to a contract can
agree that a certain state's law will govern the resolution of issues submitted to arbitration,... federal
law governs the categories of claims subject to arbitration.").
156.

Katsoris, supra note 2.

157. Mastrobuono,20 F.3d at 718. "Given our conclusion that the parties wished to arbitrate all
of their disputes subject to Garrity, there is no need to consider whether the Garrity rule is preempted
by the FAA or by the federal common law." Id.
158.
159.

Id.
See generally supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
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substantive law.' 6 In Fahnestock and the instant case, New York state law, the
Garrityrule prohibiting arbitral awards of punitive damages, was applied because
jurisdiction rested on diversity.'' However, this position has been criticized by
the Seventh Circuit as well as other courts.'62 Furthermore, there is authority
which provides that parties wishing to arbitrate disputes rather than litigate them,
should not have remedial powers restricted simply because the procedure they
chose is not a traditional judicial forum.'63
In Baravati, the court argued against the Fahnestock holding that "state
common law of arbitration governs cases under the Federal Arbitration Act unless
the parties have expressed their intentions not to be bound by it."'i64 Judge
Posner, writing for the court in Baravati,explained that such a rule would be "an
implausible candidate for incorporation into the federal common law of
arbitration" and concluded that "[sitate common law hostile to arbitration is
preempted by federal common law friendly to it.' ' 165 The Baravati court also
66
stated that the FAA applies to diversity cases affecting interstate commerce.
Since the instant case was based on diversity jurisdiction and affected interstate
commerce, the FAA should have governed the Agreement. Once federal
is little doubt that arbitrators
substantive law is invoked through the FAA, there
167
should be allowed to award punitive damages.
B. Intent to Authorize Punitive Damages
After determining that the FAA does not apply, the instant case focuses on
the intent of the parties to include punitive damages through incorporation of the

160. Fahnestock,935 F.2d at 518. The Second Circuit reiterated this analysis in its later Barbier
decision. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 121.
161. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717; Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
162. Baravati, 28 F.3d at 711. The Mendez court criticized application of the Garrity rule on
a different basis. The securities broker in that case admitted at trial and on appeal "that the sole reason
for incorporating a New York law provision was to preclude punitive damage awards." Mendez, 17
Cal. App. 4th at 1904 n.9, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832. However, the broker "did not see fit to spell out
that reason in plain language in the ... Agreement, but instead, disguised it." Id.
163. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 10. The court in Raytheon found it "sensible to interpret the 'all
disputes' and 'any remedy or relief' phrases [contained in the agreement] to indicate, at a minimum,
an intention to resolve through arbitration any dispute that would otherwise be settled in a court, and
to allow the chosen dispute resolvers to award the same varieties and forms of damages or relief as a
court would be empowered to award." Id.
164. Id. at 710. The court also stated that "[a]lthough Fahnestock is distinguishable from the
present case, we will not be coy and attempt to conceal our disagreement with it." Id. at 710-11.
165. Id. at 711.
166. Id. at 707.
167. In Singer, the court found that "[i]f an issue is arbitrable under federal law, it remains so
despite contrary state law." Singer, 699 F. Supp. at 276 ("Section 2 of the Arbitration Act evidences
a desire to create a national policy favoring arbitration."). See also Willis, 569 F. Supp. at 824; Joseph
P. Lakatos and Thomas G. Stenson, Note, Punitive Damages Under the FederalArbitrationAct: Have
Arbitrators Remedial Powers Been Circumscribedby State Law?, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT
661 n.28 (1992).
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Under the Agreement, the
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedures. 6 '
Mastrobuonos could have chosen to arbitrate befoe either the NYSE or the
NASD, both of which have been interpreted not to include punitive damages as
within the scope of potential remedies.'69 However, the majority view takes a
contrary position and would afford the language170of those organizations a broader
reading in light of their treatment of the issue.
Although not specifically addressed within the rules of these organizations,
both evince intent to allow arbitral awards of punitive damages. 17 ' The NASD
Manual specifically addresses the issue of punitive damages and informs parties
that arbitrators may consider punitive damages as a remedy. 172 The NYSE also
demonstrates intent to include punitive damages as a possible remedy by providing
a specific heading on the award form marked "punitive damages."' 73 Courts
taking the restrictive view of this language state that these organizations should
have explicitly empowered arbitrators to award punitive damages if they intended
to do so.1' 4 However, contrary authority holds that silence on the issue of
punitive damages does not imply a lack of power to make such awards.'7 "

168. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717.
169. Id. at 715. In Jana, the court determined that, although the NASD Manual specifically
addresses the issue of punitive damages, only the Code was incorporated into the agreement Jana,
835 F. Supp. at 412. In Fahnestock,the court determined that the NYSE Constitution and arbitration
rules do not authorize arbitrators to award punitive damages because they fail to address the issue of
remedies. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519.
170. Three courts have found that an agreement contemplates punitive damages even though the
NASD Code was incorporated into the agreement. In Mendez, the court determined that the NASD's
failure to specifically address the issue of punitive damages did not expressly preclude arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages. Mendez, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1092, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831. Two different
federal district courts within the Tenth Circuit also reached the same result. Kelley, 830 F. Supp. at
580 ("the incorporation of the NASD Code of Arbitration Rules provides the arbitration panel with the
authority to award punitive damages"); Pyle, 758 F. Supp. at 640.
171. See Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717; Fahnestock,935 F.2d at 521 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
172. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717; see also Mendez, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1092, 21 Cal. Rptr.
2d 826, 831.
173. Fahnestock,935 F.2d at 521 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
174. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
175. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (see supra note 45) does not specifically
mention punitive damages, but contains the same language in it's Arbitrator's Manual as the NASD
Manual. Katsoris, supra note 2. Katsoris finds more evidence of intent to include punitive damages
as a possible remedy in the following language of the Conference's Code:
Moreover, in order to prevent the insertion of restrictive clauses in customers' agreements,
...the Code specifically prohibits conditions that 'limit or contradict the rules of the
Securities Regulatory Organizations [the NASD is one of these], or limit the ability of a
party to file any claim in arbitration or limit the ability of the arbitrators to make any
award.' Although this prohibition does not specifically mention punitive damages, it
clearly expresses a strong distaste for restrictions in customers' agreements which limit
the claim or award rendered by the arbitrators. In this regard, choice-of-law provisions
which . . . mandate the law to be applied in deciding the dispute, can be restrictive.
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Chief among this authority, the Seventh Circuit in Baravati avers that "no
negative inference can be drawn from the failure of the NASD's Code. . . to say
anything about the scope of the arbitrators powers."' 76 The instant case in fact
draws a negative inference by finding that the language of the NASD Code does
not authorize arbitrators to award punitive damages because it fails to specifically
provide for such awards.'
The norm, as stated by the Baravati court, is that
"[s]ilence implies, given the tradition of allowing arbitrators flexible remedial
discretion, the absence of categorical limitations.""' Instead of viewing the
NASD language as restricting the scope of available remedies in arbitration, the
court could have taken a more expansive view, consistent with the interpretation
given the AAA rules. 79 Liberal construction of the NASD Code language
would further consistency among the circuits and provide predictability in accord
with federal policy under the FAA. 8 0
V. CONCLUSION
When a dispute arises between an investor and a broker, the chosen method
to resolve the dispute should not involve a difference in the scope of possible
remedies or the amount of potential relief.'8' The critical issue is that the
investor should be able to rely on the same remedies, whether arbitration is chosen
or traditional courtroom litigation.'82 In Mastrobuono, the court's restriction on
the arbitrator's power to award punitive damages only furthers the conflict
between the circuits. The result of this conflict is that "courts in different
jurisdictions reach contrary results with respect to the availability of punitive
damages in cases involving similarly situated parties and identical arbitration

176. Baravati, 28 F.3d at 710.

177. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717. The court stated that "[w]e do not think that [the] provision
of the Manual authorizes an award or punitive damages in derogation of the governing law of the
agreement." Id. The instant decision relied on Illinois policy disfavoring arbitral awards of punitive
damages. Id. at 719. However, the Baravati court did not consider this an appropriate case to apply
in the context of commercial arbitration. Baravati, 28 F.3d at 710. In addition, the Baravati court
stated that "we do not think that a state policy based . . . on mistrust of arbitrators is a plausible
candidate for incorporation into the federal common law of arbitration." Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added). Through this assertion, criticism of applying state policy hostile to
arbitration and the criticism of the Second Circuit's treatment of punitive damages in Fahnestock,
Judge Posner illustrates discontent with the instant decision.
179. Several courts have interpreted the language of the AAA to include punitive damages within
the scope of remedies available in arbitration. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
In Fahnestock, the court distinguishes between the language of the NYSE and the AAA and
implies that had the agreement incorporated the AAA rules, punitive damages may have been available.
Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518-19.
180. In Baravat, the court noted that "[a]bout half of all registered broker-dealers belong to [the
NASD]." Baravati, 28 F.3d at 708.
181. Katsoris, supra note 2.
182. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

21

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1995, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 7
[Vol. 1995, No. I
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
agreements."' 3 If the split in authority continues, a New York investor
defrauded by a broker will not be entitled to the same relief as a California
investor defrauded by the same broker. 4 Such a result is unsettling at best.'
ADDENDUM

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Mastrobuono
and an eight justice majority, headed by Justice Stevens, reversed the Seventh
Circuit decision.' 86 Justice Stevens, holding that the arbitral award of punitive
damages should have been enforced, found punitive damages as an arbitrable issue
under the terms of the parties' contract.' 87 In addition, the Court found the
Seventh Circuit's reading of the contract erroneous due to conflicting
interpretations given the arbitration and choice-of-law provisions. 8 If punitive
damages are determined to be within the contemplation of an arbitration
agreement, the FAA guarantees enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate
according to its terms, even if state law prevents arbitration of such claims.'89
Justice Thomas, the sole dissenter, rejected the majority's conflict between the
arbitration and choice-of-law provisions and would have enforced the parties'
law, which specifically prevents arbitrators from
contract according to New York
9
awarding punitive damages. 0
Supreme Court precedent states that the FAA will enforce arbitration
agreements, leaving for the majority the task of determining whether the parties
included punitive damages as an arbitrable issue.' 9' In making this determination,
the Court focused on Paragraph 13, which contains the arbitration and choice-oflaw provisions of the contract. 92 After examining each clause separately, the
Court analyzed the meaning of the two provisions as a whole. 93 Beginning with
the choice-of-law clause, the majority found this provision ambiguous regarding
the exclusion of punitive damages for failure to specify whether New York
substantive law or procedural law applies.' 94 If both are applicable, New York's
allocation of power between courts and arbitrators may prevent an arbitral award

183. J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. 2182,2183 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. Katsoris, supra note 2.
185. Id.
186. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 1995 WL 86555 (U.S. 1995).
187. Id. at *6.
188. Id.
189. Id. at '4.
190. Id. at *6, *9 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at *4. The cases relied upon by the Court are Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 1995
WL 15045 (U.S. 1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); and Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1(1984).
192. Masftrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *4. See supra note 10 for a description of Paragraph 13.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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of punitive damages under the facts of this case.' 95 However, in adopting a
restrictive reading of the choice-of-law clause as more appropriate, the Court held
that only New York substantive law applies.'96 As to the arbitration provision,
the Court found that the language of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedures
and Manual
strongly suggests that punitive damages are available as a potential
97
award.1
Finally, reading Paragraph 13 as a whole, the Court determined that the
choice-of-law provision created ambiguity in the arbitration agreement which, in
the alternative, would allow an award of punitive damages.' 9" Keeping in mind
that ambiguities regarding the scope of arbitration are to be resolved in favor of
arbitration, the Court turned to principles of contract law to determine if the
parties' agreed to arbitrate punitive damages.' 99 First, the Court construed the
contract against Shearson, as the drafter of an ambiguous contract.2"e Second,
the interpretation offered by Shearson, that the choice-of-law and arbitration
provisions contradict each other, violates the general contract law principle which
requires interpreting a contract to afford consistency between its provisions.2 '
In conclusion, the Court interpreted the choice-of-law provision to allow N~w
York substantive law to apply, with the exception of "special" rules limiting the
authority of arbitrators.2"2 Furthermore, the arbitration provision governed the
parties' rights regarding the scope of arbitral issues."' By this interpretation of
Paragraph 13, the Court harmonized the two provisions to remove any potential
intrusion imposed upon each other.20 4
For several reasons, Justice Thomas dissented with the majority and found
that the FAA does not force arbitration on parties, rather it enforces an agreement
to arbitrate in the manner provided by the parties." 5 Justice Thomas found the
facts of this case indistinguishable from the facts of Volt InformationSciences, Inc.

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at *5. Under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 41(e), arbitrators may award
"damages and other relief." Id. See also supra note 134 and accompanying text. The Manual
provided to NASD arbitrators specifically mentions punitive damages as a potential remedy: "The
issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in arbitrations. Parties are informed that
arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy." Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,the Court stated that "any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability." Mose H. Cone Mem. Hosp.. 460 U.S. at 24-25.
200. Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *5.
20. Id. at *6.
202- Id. Under the Garrity rule, New York prevents arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
203. Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *6.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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v. Leland Stanford Junior University,"6 wherein the Court enforced a choice-oflaw provision, despite its "anti-arbitration" character.20 7 Justice Thomas argues
that the Garrity rule limiting arbitrators authority to award punitive damages is
exactly the type of state law rule governing arbitration which Volt requires federal
courts to enforce.20 8 In addition, Justice Thomas found the majority's reading
of the NASD Code and Manual unpersuasive. 0 9 The NASD Code fails to
specifically address punitive damages and does not require that arbitrators be
empowered to award punitive damages. 210 The Manual, although mentioning
punitive damages, is not an official NASD document and should not be read to
resolve the issue of punitive damages. 1 Under Justice Thomas's view, New
York's express preclusion of punitive damages from arbitration as opposed to the
silence of the NASD Code on the issue does not raise a conflict in which
Justice Thomas concluded with a
arbitration must ultimately prevail.212
2 3
comment on the limited nature of the majority opinion. " By avoiding broad
statements regarding preemption of state law by the FAA and deciding the case
on general principles of contract law, the majority carved a narrow path with
limited applicability.
Although the Mastrobuonos will receive their $ 400,000.00 punitive damages
award, this decision can be regarded as a victory for Shearson because it does not
limit their ability to draft future agreements excluding punitive damages as a
potential remedy.214 Shearson may avoid future punitive judgments by amending
their arbitration provisions to expressly preclude punitive damages as an arbitrable
issue. Investors, such as the Mastrobuonos, may lose all rights to receive punitive
damages because the FAA requires enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate
according to its terms.2" 5 The NASD has taken steps to avoid this result by
enacting a rule which prohibits its members from drafting arbitration agreements
limiting an arbitrator's ability to make any award.2" 6 However, this has no

206. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
207. Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *7 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Volt, the parties contract
contained a choice-of-law clause and an arbitration agreement. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *8.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *9.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *10.
214. In fact, the decision fails to mention whether securities brokers, in general, may draft
contracts specifically excluding puntive damages. Joan Biskupic, High CourtRules Against Brokerage;
Justices Say Firms Can't Bar Punitive Damages in Arbitration Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1995.
However, Supreme Court precedent demonstrates a federal policy in favor of arbitration in general and
will enforce an agreement to arbitrate as drafted by the parties. Volt Info. Sciences, 489 U.S. at 475.
215. Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *4.
216. Id. at *5 n.6. Rule 21(f)(4) of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice states: "No agreement
[between a member and a customer] shall include any condition which.., limits the ability of a party
to file any claim in arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitrators to make any award." This Rule
was inapplicable to the Mastrobuono's case because it was enacted in 1989 and the Mastrobuonos
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effect on members of other associations and may not be enforceable in court. The
Supreme Court did not improve investors' substantive right to recover punitive
damages; it merely demonstrated how large brokers may avoid such penalties in
the future.

ISHAM R. JONES, III

executed their agreement with Shearson in 1985. Id.
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